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Abstract
The present paper provides a meta-study of security and defence foresight documents by the Atlantic Alliance, European Union
and various official bodies linked to the Defence Ministries of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and
United States. It focuses on the political and social trends impacting on defence and military issues. In global terms, the following
can be discerned: rivalry among major powers, with armed conflict between some not ruled out entirely; armed non-state actors
strengthened by new technologies; global competition for natural resources; extensive demographic imbalances and migration
flows; global risks associated with fragile states. In terms of European internal policy, the following trends are identified:
population ageing and the challenges associated with immigrant integration; empowerment of interest-based and identity net-
works. The paper begins by familiarising readers with the characteristics of foresight documents and the methodologies used in
their preparation.
Keywords Strategic studies . Security . Defence .Military . Global risks
Introduction
The perception exists that we are living through times
of confusion and raid change. Indeed, the Arab upris-
ings of 2011, the territorial gains of the Islamic
Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in 2014, Brexit and
Donald Trump’s victory in the United States presidential
elections in 2016 are all developments with immense
significance that could scarcely have been anticipated
at the turn of the decade [1, 2].
Faced with such phenomena, strategic analysis and
foresight studies help systematise information, stimulate
open-mindedness and generate knowledge geared to
decision-making in public affairs [3–5]. During the last
decade, the Atlantic Alliance, European Union and a
variety of bodies affiliated to the Defence ministries of
the main countries in North America and Europe in
terms of gross defence spending (Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and United
States) have compiled foresight studies to identify and
analyse the major political and social trends that will
affect global security during the period 2030–2045.
The present paper aims to offer an overview of the
results of the aforementioned works, providing insight
into the major trends which, according to these official
documents, will shape global relations, politics and so-
ciety during the second third of the twenty-first century.
Criteria for the choice of foresight studies
and methodologies used
Dozens of foresight research projects –private and public, na-
tional and international– address in some way or other the
drivers associated with the major political and social trends
that will impact on the future of global security.
In order to narrow the scope of the present work, it was
decided to focus on foresight documents of a public nature
drawn up between 2007 and 2017 by official defence and
security bodies within the so-called Euro-Atlantic Area
(North America and Western Europe). This delimitation al-
lows us to gain a perspective –in many respects common
within said area– concerning the trends that will determine
the future of global security. Most of the documents refer to
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security – often global security– despite being produced by
bodies linked to Defence ministries. However, this is consis-
tent with the current broader concept of security, which ex-
tends beyond the purely military aspects –traditionally associ-
ated with defence– to embrace other dimensions such as po-
litical, societal, economic and environmental security.
The list of documents is as follows:
– Canada: The Future Security Environment 2008–2030
[6]; The Future Security Environment 2013–2040 [7].
– European Union: Global Trends to 2030, Can the EU
meet the challenges ahead? [8].
– France: Strategic Horizons 2040 [9]. Capstone Concept
on the Employment of Armed Force [10, 11].
– Germany: White Paper 2016 on German Security Policy
and the Future of the Bundeswehr [12].
– Italy: The World in 2030. Regional Trends [13]; White
Paper on International Security and Defence [14];
Capstone Concept CC – 001 Military Implications of
the Future Operational Environment [15].
– North Atlantic Treaty Organization: NATO Multiple
Futures Project Navigating towards 2030 Final Report
[16]; Strategic Foresight Analysis 2013 Report [17];
Strategic Foresight Analysis 2015 Report [18];
Framework for Future Alliance Operations [19].
– Spain: La Fuerza Conjunta ante los retos del futuro.
Preparándonos para las operaciones hasta el 2030
[Future Challenges Faced by the Joint Force. Preparing
operations towards 2030] [20].
– United Kingdom: Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2045
[21]; Future Operating Environment 2035 [22].
– United States of America: Global Trends 2030,
Alternative Worlds [23]; Global Trends, Paradox of
Progress [24]; Joint Operating Environment 2035 [25];
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 [26]
The majority of the documents include an explanation of
the methodology adopted. Broadly speaking, this can be
summarised as follows:
– A steering group, attached to the centre or programme
responsible for producing the document, coordinates the
process and drafts the final report.
– The group commences its work with a review of similar
documents drawn up by allied countries and other fore-
sight reports on similar topics (for example, by the various
United Nations and World Bank agencies, etc.). It also
carries out a study of the present-day strategic environment
and of the main trends according to official sources, aca-
demic publications and international think tanks.
– Following the above review and document screening, the
group begins its analysis with a preliminary proposal of
variables –which can be considered independent
variables with respect to the dependent variable ‘future
scenario’– that will shape the future. There appears to be
no common terminology in the literature we have exam-
ined. Some reports refer to the variables as drivers [16].
Others call them trends. Some even distinguish between
themes and trends, the former being groupings of the
latter [17]. A number of trends are firm and known, and
their evolution is considered largely predictable. These
are denoted megatrends by the US National Intelligence
Council (NIC) and projections by European Strategy and
Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) [8, 23]. Then there are
drivers whose evolution is difficult to determine. These
are called game changers by the NIC, uncertainties by
ESPAS, and step changes by France’s Delegation for
Strategic Affairs (DAS) (although in this last case, mid-
way between uncertainties and wild cards) [8, 9, 23].
– A number of the reports outline scenarios based on the
trends identified [16, 20, 23, 24]. Normally these scenar-
ios are few in number (three or four) and are not mutually
exclusive. It is assumed that a combination of some or
more may occur, with varying degrees of intensity in
different regions of the world. The scenarios are not
intended to cover all configurations of the future. The
possible combinations of the different drivers –not to
mention the impact of potential black swans– would trig-
ger an unmanageable number of scenarios, the degree of
likelihood of which would be determined by subjective
evaluations. The aim of the suggested scenarios is to put
forward possible alternative visions of the future, chal-
lenge accepted assumptions, and foster open reflection
on coming challenges and opportunities [24].
– External advice is sought throughout the process, usually
in the form of monographic studies by academics or con-
sultants who address in greater depth some of the key
variables identified in the previous step. Seminars with
international experts from various sectors (academic,
think-tanks, public administration, military, defence cor-
porations, NGOs, multinationals, etc.) are often organised
to present and discuss interim results, with creativity en-
couraged through structured analysis techniques such as
brainstorming, cross impact, future wheel, Delphi meth-
od, simulation games, etc.). In some cases (NATO or NIC
projects, for example), various rounds of seminars are
organised as the project advances. Lastly, some
programmes (UK Defence Ministry) submit the final
draft for final review by national and international aca-
demic and military experts and think-tanks. Broadly
speaking, the aim is to ensure transparency of process,
openness to exchange, and a collaborative work ethos.
– The work is updated periodically following the publica-
tion of the final report: every five years in the case of the
NIC’s Global Trends or UK Defence Ministry’s Global
Strategic Trends. Every two years in the case of NATO’s
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Strategic Foresight Analysis. The review by the steering
group, often involving repetition of the steps described
above, leads to a new final report. This iterative process
is in keeping with foresight methodology and consistent
with the cyclical nature of the defence planning to which
the projects are linked.
As can be seen, these processes entail high costs –by aca-
demic standards– and require a high degree of access and
participation by defence administrations. By way of example,
the NATO Multiple Futures Project organised 21 workshops
involving over 500 experts from 45 countries [16]. For its part,
the process leading to the NIC’s Global Trends, Paradox of
Progress included travel to 36 countries and meetings with
2500 people, among them academics from different fields,
intellectuals, members of religious organisations, business
and industry representatives, diplomats, development experts,
civil society representatives, etc. [24]. It would be hard to find
projects on similar themes and of the same magnitude in the
academic field of Social Sciences. Nonetheless, as already
noted, the world of academia does have a say in the drafting
of most of the documents and the final product –the public
report– is an invitation to further reflection on the contents,
including by university researchers.
We will now turn to review the aforementioned works, fo-
cusing our attention on the major social and political trends that
will affect and condition the design of Defence policy in the
countries studied. In terms of length, the documents reviewed
ranged between 70 pages (shortest) and somewhere above 200
(longest). Clearly, a categorical separation of the political and
social trends from those of a different nature (economic, envi-
ronment, technology…) is not possible. However, for reasons
of space this paper will only refer to the latter insofar as they
significantly affect the political and social trends.
Changes in the world system
A first aspect to consider are the drivers associated with the
configuration of the world system during the period 2030–
2045, the rise and decline of major powers, the tendency to-
wards conflict or cooperation in their relations, the risks de-
rived from fragile states, and the growing importance of non-
state actors. Three broad sets of drivers of change can be
identified from the contents of the reports. All three appear
in the majority of the documents, although with nuances and
uncertainties that will be discussed below.
Changes associated with multipolarity, integration
and cooperation/conflict dynamics
All the documents predict a greater distribution of relative
power among the major powers and, although acknowledging
the importance of international organisations and non-state
actors, they assume that states will continue to be the main
actors in the system [7].
Transformationswith far-reaching consequences for interna-
tional relations occur periodically –in the case of the twentieth
century, in steps of one or two decades [8]. The changes trig-
gered by the 2001 terrorist attacks on Washington and New
York and the Arab uprisings of 2011 are prime examples.
However, in terms of the distribution of relative power, the
most important change occurred between 1989 and the early
1990swhen the bipolar world systemwas replaced by an asym-
metric multipolar system, with one sole superpower capable of
acting and exerting significant influence at global level.
If the trend towards a greater distribution of power con-
tinues, the United States will be one of the main players in
the international system under the new model, although its
supremacy will be increasingly eroded by the rise of other
major powers, especially China [12, 19]. China is expected to
become the world’s leading economy around 2030, when the
country’s leadership would be in a position to turn economic
might into solid military power [8]. The UK Ministry of
Defence document estimates that China could match US mili-
tary spending by 2045, with the two countries accounting to-
gether for 45% of the world’s defence budget [21]. Canada’s
more conservative document predicts that, in military and eco-
nomic terms, the United States will still be the most powerful
actor in the world system in 2040 [7]. The same opinion is held
by France’s DAS, although it considers likely that China will
take over the United States’ policing role in Asia Pacific [9].
For its part, the ESPAS report considers that China could over-
take the United States in defence spending before the end of the
2020s, although this would not translate to a genuine military
advantage from 2030 onwards [8]. According to the United
Kingdom, the United States will continue to be the world’s
leading military power in 2035, although facing increasing
competition from China, as noted above [22].
India is set to be another major actor. The UK foresight
programme estimates that India’s Defence spending could sur-
pass that of the whole of Europe in 2045 [21]. Russia is also
expected to continue to play a leading role on the international
stage, albeit a long way behind the main powers due to the
uncertainties surrounding its economic power and to its neg-
ative demographic growth [9]. Regarding military spending,
ESPAS considers that Russia’s defence budget could exceed
the combined budget of France, Germany and the United
Kingdom in 2035 [8]. In other words, and as John
Mearsheimer notes, Russia would be more effective than
Western European countries in converting its potential power
into military power [27: 55–82]. However, the basis for the
ESPAS forecast is open to question. The demographic and
economic issues that threaten Russia’s present and future
would, in all likelihood, pose a serious obstacle to sustained
and heavy Defence investment by the country.
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Even though a war between the big powers would inflict
massive damage on the parties and is therefore highly unlikely,
it is a fact of history that great systemic transitions of power
have been accompanied by armed conflicts on a similar scale
[7, 9, 25]. Economic interdependence curbs aggressive behav-
iour by major powers but is not an absolute guarantee that
direct armed conflict between them will be avoided [28, 29].
An increased share of relative power tends to fuel confidence
and ambition, redefining new interests and goals [25].
Increased geopolitical competition can trigger crises,
misjudgements and military escalations when power is
exercised in locations where respective areas of influence over-
lap (Arctic, Eastern Europe, Asia Pacific, etc.). Similarly, in-
creased rivalry among major powers will make recourse to the
use of veto in the UN Security Council more frequent, thus
hampering the functioning of the security system [24].
The growing distribution of power will entail a return to
pre-World War II historic normality to a multipolar world.
More significantly, however, it will mark the end of western
hegemony, which has been a permanent feature of the last two
centuries. This will come about as a result of the declining
relative power of the United States and, above all, Europe’s
loss of importance [9, 14]. The reports analysed coincide to a
large degree in signalling a shift in the world’s centre from the
Euro-Atlantic area to Asia Pacific, although ESPAS notes that
this will depend on the continuation of the current economic
and social order and on emerging countries achieving
sustained growth [9]. In a similar vein, the French DAS and
one Italian report warn that a slowing or even downturn in
China’s economic growth, coupled with serious social in-
equalities, could lead to major social and political instability
in the Asian powerhouse [9, 13].
In essence, three main trends are causing a decline in
Europe’s relative share of power:
– The endemic problem of the lack of a common foreign
policy, which may become further exacerbated by the se-
rious challenges –already evident today– to internal cohe-
sion, which may jeopardise the continuity of the EU pro-
ject in the medium term [8, 9, 12]. Similarly, the lack of a
common defence policy to end the paradox of ineffective
military spending, namely, excessive amounts spent on
personnel compared to the United States and the redun-
dancy of certain resources, leading critical capabilities to
remain unaddressed [8]. The European Union will only be
viewed and treated as a major power if its members act in
close concertation. Even the United Kingdom – in the
process of exiting the Union– accepts that it will suffer a
significant loss of influence and that it will have more
peers to contend with from 2035 onwards [22].
– Europe’s loss of economic competitiveness in the global
market due to structural problems in its economy, a R &
Dmodel incapable of transforming knowledge into viable
technological innovation, and an acutely ageing popula-
tion that will place its welfare system in jeopardy [8, 13].
– Strategic withdrawal, due to the cumulative disappoint-
ment of numerous military and civilian stabilisation inter-
ventions in fragile or failed states, and more limited avail-
ability of resources for such missions [9, 19]. Most of the
documents analysed agree that the structural problems of
Europe’s economies, combined with an ageing popula-
tion and the resulting pressure on the welfare system, will
impact negatively on defence budgets, limiting the
European Union’s capacity as a global actor [7, 20].
This loss of capacity and international influence would
also affect the United States negatively as Europe’s con-
tribution to NATO, still important even if not comparable
to that of the United States, would fall. This would in-
crease the room for manoeuvre of potential rivals of both
Europe and the United States [25].
Aweakening of the transatlantic link could further aggravate
the moderate eclipse of Europe on the world stage. The United
States is moving towards self-sufficiency in energy, while
Europe is surrounded by an arc of crisis (Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa) from which the
Americans could disengage to some extent, opting for a second-
ary role and leaving primary responsibility to Europeans [8].
Moreover, the multipolar world of 2030–2045 will not nec-
essarily comprise regional blocs speaking with a single voice.
Along with the distribution of relative power, another crucial
variable in terms of the future will be the level of political and
economic ‘integration’ among states. As a driver of change, this
may acquire values ranging from maximum to minimum de-
pending on the region but also at global level. To the above one
needs to be added a third variable at global systemic level, called
‘friction’ in NATO’s Multiple Futures Project, with values rang-
ing from cooperation to confrontation [16]. The lack of integra-
tion and logic of conflict would give rise to a volatile world –or
regions – which would translate to, for example:
– Powers with aspirations of regional hegemony [25]. Such
a situation is likely to prompt other powers to act as re-
gional counterweights and would lead to conflict dynam-
ics, as demonstrated by the history and the realist theory
of International Relations [30: 102–128]. Should the nu-
clear factor enter the scenario as a source of power –as has
occurred recently with North Korea and, prior to the
signing of the agreement, with Iran–, the military
nuclearisation of an emerging regional power would fos-
ter proliferation in neighbouring states [24, 25].
– Proxy wars as part of the aforementioned battle for re-
gional hegemony. Similar to those taking place today in
the Middle East, in scenarios such as Syria and Yemen.
Participants in suchwars would include not just powers in
the region but offshore balancers also [25].
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– At the same time, direct or proxy armed conflicts will
continue to see the use of hybrid strategies combining
the fighting methods of conventional armies and those
of insurgents (guerrilla warfare, terrorist attacks). These
strategies may be accompanied by strategic communica-
tion actions designed to delegitimise and destabilise op-
ponents (cyber attacks). This has been a constant feature
throughout history, with the specificities afforded by the
technological and social context of each period [15]. The
new aspect today, and in the coming decades, is the role
played by technologies in enhancing military capabilities
and multiplying the transnational impact of the tactics
used [26]. Also, the use of non-state actors as proxies to
inflict severe damage but ensure deniability [18]. For ex-
ample, recourse to hackers for sophisticated cyber attacks
or to networks of investigative journalists, who are fed
self-serving information from one’s own intelligence ser-
vices. Hostile actions in the so-called gray zone (the no-
man’s land between peace and war) hamper international
crisis management given that they undermine the effec-
tiveness of traditional tools such as diplomacy and deter-
rence [9, 24, 25, 31].
– Remote military interventions in the form of cyber attack
by untraceable perpetrators or long-range armed air and
naval unmanned systems [21, 24]. The series of attacks
on Al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal regions –carried out en-
tirely with armed drones– are a taste of things to come and
are politically attractive due to their low profile and zero
own casualties [32]. For their part, the proliferation of
cyber weapons and long-range conventional attack sys-
tems could prove destabilising in crisis situations, due to
the fears of a preventive attack that would give the party
striking first an overwhelming advantage [24, 33].
– Power games in which powers seek to lead coalitions
consisting of other states, non-state actors and even
decentralised identity networks in order to increase their
external influence [24]. Network leadership is also useful
for implementing hybrid strategies in armed conflicts and
for operating in the gray zone [31].
Among the many issues on the international agenda, there
are two of particular importance that will affect, on the one
hand, interactions in this future multipolar world and, on the
other, integration/division and cooperation/conflict drivers:
– The growing demand for resources, beginning with ener-
gy. It is estimated that energy demand will grow by 50% in
2040 compared to today’s levels, with 80% continuing to
be supplied by hydrocarbons [7, 9]. Other studies predict
that demand in 2045 will be double that of the present day
[22]. Moreover, it is anticipated that the energy demand
from China, India and South-East Asia will account for
65% of the world total in 2035 [8]. However, this scenario
could be turned on its head by a technology breakthrough
such as the International Fusion Project, which aims to
produce unlimited energy safely and cheaply [8, 22]. If
that were to occur, it would be a black swan with positive
consequences –although less so for countries whose econ-
omies depend chiefly on hydrocarbons.
In addition, problems of access to water and food resources
will arise. Half of the world’s population will suffer restrictions
on drinking water consumption in 2035. Over 30 countries, 15
of them in the Middle East, will suffer serious water shortages
and this could trigger regional tensions and conflicts [9, 17, 18,
20, 22, 24]. The demand for raw materials, including so-called
rare minerals, which are vital for the production of many day-
to-day technologies (from computers to fluorescent tubes and
cell phones) and military technologies (for example, satellite
communications and guided weapons), will grow also. China
currently possesses more than 85% of such minerals and there-
fore enjoys a near-monopoly position [7, 9, 22].
– Access to and transit through the global commons. The
Antarctic and, in particular, international waters and air
space, straits, outer space (satellites) and cyberspace [7, 9,
22, 23, 26]. The global commons are vital to the function-
ing of globalised economies [34]. The Arctic is expected
to become the centre of attention due to its underground
resources (which would not be global commons but
claimed by neighbouring states) and the sea routes which
are opening up due melting ice and which will make Asia
more reachable from North America and Europe [8, 22].
Geopolitical competition and, in a worst-case scenario,
open armed conflict between major powers would endan-
ger the availability of these global commons. In the case
of outer space, conflict involving anti-satellite weapons
would generate more space debris and the associated
risks. For its part, transit through maritime routes crucial
to world trade could be subject to blackmail by warring
parties, with serious consequences for economies, partic-
ularly in Europe, which will still be importing 65–70% of
its energy needs in 2030 [8, 25].
These two issues –demand for resources and global com-
mons–will be a source of both problems and opportunities for
integration and cooperation at global and regional level.
Changes associated with fragile or failed states
All the documents consulted assume that weak states incapable
of controlling or governing part or all of their territory will
continue to exist during the period 2030–2045. However, four
drivers may aggravate further their already precarious political
and social situation:
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– Demographic imbalances. It is estimated that the world’s
population will exceed 8 billion in 2030, reach 8.5 billion
in 2035, near 9 billion in 2040, and peak at 10.5 billion in
2045 [6–8, 17, 22]. Other projections put the figure at
between 7.3 billion and 8.8 billion in 2035 [24, 25].
There is, however, agreement that this growth will be
very uneven geographically, with the bulk affecting
Africa, followed by certain Central Asian and Middle
Eastern countries [24]. It is forecasted that the population
of working age in Sub-Saharan Africa will exceed that of
China in 2030 and India in 2035. By way of contrast,
Western Europe and Russia have been suffering birth
rates below the replacement rate for many years [22].
Accordingly, the majority of the planet’s young population
will be located –as at present– in developing countries, while
advanced economies will experience ageing processes and a net
population loss which will become very acute as the 2030s and
2040s draw nearer. Depending on the evolution of other factors,
this circumstance represents an opportunity and a threat for less
advanced countries. It could stimulate economic growth, if ac-
companied by improvements to education and the economic
model that allow this sizeable human capital to join the labour
market. However, it could also become a factor of instability if
the national economy is incapable of accommodating young
people and if such precariousness is combined with high levels
of corruption and a weak political system and institutions [22].
Thus, the existence of a large segment of young people in the
population offers an opportunity for economic growth but at the
same time is a factor of risk and instability [7, 13]. This is
particularly true of fragile or partially failed states.
On the other hand, world population growth will slow as of
the 2040s and is expected to become negative due to the grad-
ual spread of economic development and of cultural models
that lower birth rates [9].
– Another global trend requiring consideration is popula-
tion migration to cities, which will trigger a substantial
increase in the number of mega-cities (more than 10 mil-
lion people). There were 19 such cities in 2007 and this
figure is expected to grow to 27 by 2025. An estimated
65% of the world’s population will live in urban areas in
2040–2045, with 95% of the growth occurring in devel-
oping countries, which will be home to the majority of
mega-cities [7, 9, 22, 25]. In such cases, the lack of infra-
structures will continue to generate problems of insalubri-
ty, inequality and social conflict [20, 22]. A considerable
portion of the increase in the urban population will centre
on coastal parts vulnerable to rising ocean levels and to
catastrophes associated with the sea [22]. It is estimated
that the coastal population will have risen by 50% in 2035
compared to the 2000 figure. The increase in Asia will be
more than 150 million, 60 million in Africa [24].
– More pronounced effects of climate change. Although
there is no consensus as to the pace of global warming,
desertification –with the resulting loss of cropland and
shortage of human drinking water– will coincide geo-
graphically with many less economically developed
countries [9, 26]. During the coming decades, 135 million
people may suffer enforced displacement due to the phe-
nomenon, which could affect internal political stability,
relations between states in the area, and migratory flows
(both south-north and, in particular, south-south) [22]. At
the same time, technological advances in the fields of
energy-saving and renewable energies during the period
2030–2040 are expected to be insufficient to curb the
increase in CO2 emissions [8].
– Continued corruption, weak institutions and democratic
deficit in many underdeveloped countries will undermine
their competitiveness in a global economy and spawn
grievances and internal instability [13, 26].
In addition to these four drivers, it is possible that some of
the aforementioned fragile or failed states could become the
scenario for a proxy war between regional or extra-regional
powers, should regional integration fail and confrontation pre-
vail over cooperation.
Meanwhile, fragile states could generate three sources of
risk for the rest of the regional and global system:
– Armed terrorist groups and organised crime groups
whose activities extend to other regions, including the
Euro-Atlantic area [9, 10, 26]. Also, groups dedicated to
piracy, placing shipping routes in danger. Such threats are
already materialising at present and could be heightened
further by advances in technology and the intensification
of globalisation. Many terrorist and insurgent groups cur-
rently utilise dual-use technologies (drones, encrypted
communication, night vision devices, GPS, etc.) which
increase their paramilitary capabilities significantly and
which, barely two decades ago, were to be found in the
arsenals of only the most advanced countries [26, 35].
This trend will become more pronounced in years to come,
with the added problem that innovative combinations of more
than one of the above technologies will result in even greater
capabilities [21, 22, 25]. Imagine, for example, self-driving cars
packed with explosives and guided not just by GPS but by a
swarm of drones in an urban combat scenario. Although the
best-equipped armies will still enjoy a technological advantage,
this will tend to diminish in relative terms if they do not adapt to
the flexibility and the strategic and tactical innovation of their
non-state opponents. This is especially true in complex, inter-
connected and highly saturated environments such as urban
ones [7, 15, 22]. The growing urbanisation of the world popu-
lation, referred to above, is a factor that will intersect frequently
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with the growing power of armed non-state actors. The wars in
Syria (Alepo) and against Daesh in Iraq (Mosul) are recent
examples of this firm trend of the future [36].
– Global pandemics. Like the flu epidemic of 1918 that
killed at least twenty million people or, less lethally, the
alarm triggered by SARS in 2003 and the Ebola outbreak
in West Africa in 2014. A virulent disease arising in or
reaching one ormore weak states would havemuch great-
er impact due to their precarious national resources, thus
increasing the risk of contagion within and beyond the
region [9, 25]. In terms of defence planning, such a risk
would require capabilities to be developed for the deploy-
ment of medical and humanitarian aid missions in the
countries concerned, as well as support for domestic civil
and health protection systems if the contagion were to
reach our own countries. [7]
– Major population movements affecting the stability and
internal cohesion of other countries, while also endanger-
ing the lives of those taking part directly in such migra-
tory flows [9, 20, 21, 23, 24]. These movements also
afford a massive opportunity for illicit business by trans-
national crime groups, an aspect that will be discussed
further below in the section dealing with major social
and political transformations.
Intensification of globalisation and interdependence
This is the third group of drivers that will affect the configu-
ration of the world system. Like population ageing, the inten-
sity of the globalisation process in the coming decades will be
unprecedented and it is therefore extremely difficult to antic-
ipate all the consequences and ramifications. Globalisation
and interdependence are a source of both risk and opportunity.
Since the documents analysed here focus on security and de-
fence, they tend to place special emphasis on the potential
problems, in particular the following:
– The danger of region-to-region contagion of economic cri-
ses due to being part of an electronically connected and
highly reactive financial system [9]. Equally, criminal or
terrorist attacks on these networks would seriously damage
investor confidence and should not be ruled out [17].
– Non-regulated displacements of the population due to
armed domestic conflicts and demographic imbalances.
France’s DAS estimates that in 2050 there will be 450
million transcontinental migrants –compared to 250 mil-
lion today– owing to political, economic or environmen-
tal reasons [9]. Moreover, according to the same body, as
of 2040 there will be 220 million regional and transcon-
tinental refugees as a result of climate change [9].
– Porous borders due to advances in technology.
Cyberspace transcends national boundaries and econo-
mies and societies that rely on it to the greatest degree
are more vulnerable. Moreover, in addition to channelling
economic activity and social relations, the Internet will
increasingly connect households and domestic appliances
(Internet of things). The omnipresence of web-connected
devices will create new vulnerabilities and require polit-
ical responses to guarantee control and security [7, 9, 22,
23, 25, 26].
– Serious difficulties in terms of guaranteeing technology
self-sufficiency in defence. The growing globalisation of
supply chains has serious implications for the defence
industry. Even in countries like the United States, where
the sector is bigger, it is already impractical to manufac-
ture all components nationally, which raises the prospect
of potential interruptions of supply or the security of com-
ponents being entrusted to manufacturers who are also
geopolitical rivals [7]. Meanwhile, various documents
draw attention to the gradual loss of competitive advan-
tage by western countries when it comes to recruiting and
training future generations of specialists in big data anal-
ysis, cloud computing, nanotechnology and other ad-
vances that will influence the economic development,
military capabilities and relative power of their respective
states [7, 23]. This could also affect the competitiveness –
and long-term economic viability– of certain sectors of
the European defence industry, which may be unable to
cope with the offer from emerging countries [9, 17].
Political and legal acceptance of certain technological ad-
vances such as lethal autonomous systems weapons will
also play a part. Some societies may be more reticent than
others to allow the development, acquisition and use of
aerial, land or sea platforms that use force according to
predetermined parameters but with tactical autonomy
[18]. This could give an advantage to governments and
societies that have the required infrastructure and are
more permissive on this issue.
Social and political transformations
In addition to the groups of drivers associated with the con-
figuration of the world system, there are other inter-related
issues that will impact on defence policy design and develop-
ment in the countries studied, largely by conditioning domes-
tic policy. They can be grouped into three blocks of drivers.
Demographic transformations
Reference has already been made to these in the previous
section. With good cause, all the documents reviewed
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coincide in underlining their importance. In the case of the
Euro-Atlantic area, there are two aspects to consider:
– The ageing of the population in the majority of econom-
ically advanced countries due to low birth rates and in-
creased life expectancy. This phenomenon is unprece-
dented and will have far-reaching social consequences
[9]. In many cases, the impact will be aggravated, partic-
ularly at individual level, by the combination with other
trends such as family break-ups and the rise in the number
of people living alone [17]. Advances in biotechnology
that improve the quality of life of the elderly may produce
palliative effects to some degree, as will technological
progress in the home which will reduce the level of de-
pendency of the aged [8, 21, 24].
Population ageing will subject the welfare system to con-
siderable stress, particularly in countries with high levels of
social benefits [8, 13, 20]. If we factor in also a decline in
productivity due to the smaller portion of working age popu-
lation, the outcome may be not just an unsustainable system
but the loss of economic competitiveness and, paradoxically –
despite the lower numbers of young people in the population–,
job destruction [24]. In such circumstances, increased welfare
spending may be to the detriment of Defence spending, hin-
dering the maintenance of advanced and increasingly costly
military capabilities [9]. At the same time, population decline
will pose a challenge for the recruitment and selection of hu-
man resources for the armed forces. [7]
– The continuation and intensification of migratory flows.
These will be triggered in part by the changes in the world
system noted above (climate change, armed conflict, lack
of security in megacities) and fostered by the interconnec-
tion arising from advances in technology, by diasporas and
migratory networks already in place in destination coun-
tries, and by the smaller proportion of working age popu-
lation in advanced countries due to population ageing [21,
23, 24]. The phenomenon will spark political tensions,
which are already evident today but will tend to become
more pronounced as the immigrant population increases in
Europe and the United States. The tensions will arise due
to the rejection of foreigners by certain sectors that view
them as a threat to security, identity and economic
wellbeing. Another source will be the specific demands
and demands for greater political representation which will
be made by the immigrant population in due course [25].
Unequal distribution of wealth
This is another high-impact driver, which is already evident
today and will become more acute in the coming decades due
to the convergence of two further factors: the intensification of
economic globalisation and its neoliberal tenets, and advances
in technology (artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, ad-
ditive manufacturing, etc.) that destroy significant numbers of
jobs [8, 24]. If trends continue as at present, the processing
capacity of computers will match that of the human brain in
2023 and will be 100,000 times higher in 2045. The increase
will be even greater if quantum computers come about [21].
Both forces could result in a widening of the rift between
‘winners’ and ‘losers’, both in the world economic system and
in national economies. This group of drivers will manifest
itself differently depending on the region.
– In the United States and particularly in Europe, the ero-
sion and deterioration of the middle class will likely con-
tinue due to the potential loss of productivity and global
competitiveness [24]. Combined with disaffection for po-
litical institutions and elites, and the rise in immigrant
population in some countries, this will produce fertile
terrain for the discourse of populist parties and extreme
left and right parties [8, 24]. In turn, the rise in anti-
establishment political proposals will endanger the EU’s
political union, including its common defence dimension
[8]. Nonetheless, some advances in technology that may
initially destroy jobs could end up bolstering productivity,
generating new areas of activity and economic growth.
Much will depend on the technical nature of the advances
and on the creativity of individuals in seeking to harness
machine-human cooperation to the full [24].
– In developing countries, poverty will continue to fall and
the middle class will grow, even if it will still be precarious
by western standards and will be more vulnerable to eco-
nomic turbulence. The rise of this middle class will also
affect migratory flows [8]. It will lead to more people with
aspirations, resources and key knowledge for emigration.
At the same time, a larger middle class will give rise to new
demands for political reform, setting in motion dynamics
of democratisation or instability depending on the case.
Most at risk will be countries where the larger middle class
coexists with masses of unemployed young people and
weak and corrupt political institutions. Approximately
10% of the world population will continue to live in ex-
treme poverty. Most of these people –nearly 40% at pres-
ent– will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa [8, 24].
Increased political relevance of interest-based
and identity networks
Although not the only factor, technology will continue to in-
crease the interaction of millions of people across the planet.
Various broad notions exist as regards advances to come in
technology but it is difficult to know when and how these will
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arrive exactly or what their social impact will be once they
encounter the creativity of users [9]. The firm trends outlined
in the works reviewed include virtual reality and augmented
reality, in turn combined with significant improvements to
holograms [17]. It is striking to note, however, that the docu-
ments in question make little mention of advances in artificial
simultaneous translation – written and oral – which could
make reliable and immediate communication possible.
Overcoming language barriers will be a watershed in global
interconnection processes, with massive repercussions.
The increased political role of identity and interest-based
networks –facilitated by the aforementioned advances in tech-
nology– will have multiple implications from the defence and
security perspective. Three in particular deserve mention:
– Changes in the relationship between individual and state.
In the United States and particularly in Europe, falling
employment, population ageing and the erosion of the
middle class will require a new social contract. Where
the state is capable of generating sufficient resources, said
pact could lead to a reshaping of the welfare system
through measures such as a living wage, which would
reduce the complicated bureaucracy needed to administer
current support mechanisms and offer individuals a min-
imum safety net to face a professional future ridden with
uncertainty. Moreover, advances in technology, particu-
larly in biotechnology (genome editing, human
perfecting, cloning, 3D bio printing, etc.), will trigger
new, costly and ethically challenging social demands.
These issues will become part of the public agenda and
the subject of debate conducted via online political par-
ticipation [9, 21, 24].
The networks intervening in this new social contract will
not consist solely of individuals empowered by social tech-
nologies. Much more open and multilateral configurations
will be adopted, as occurs for example in the World
Economic Forum (also known as Davos and which brings
together business leaders, politicians, journalists, intellectuals,
NGOs and other civil society representatives). These new net-
works will articulate new social demands, define problems
and propose solutions outside the scope of states, even if ac-
cording the latter ultimate responsibility.
In turn, states are likely to devolve powers increasingly to
lower levels of government (big cities, for instance) and to the
private sector. The multiplicity of actors and complexity of
problems will render governance more difficult [14, 17, 24,
25]. In Western countries, these domestic challenges will oc-
cupy a substantial portion of governments’ political ‘band-
width’, reducing their capacity –and appetite– for military
interventions abroad that do not enjoymajority support among
the public. At the same time, immediacy –including 24/7 news
cycles–, coupled with short-term approaches dictated by
election calendars are an invitation to neglect planning and
long-term commitments [8].
A further dimension where changes in the relation between
individual and state are anticipated concerns the view of the
latter as the ultimate provider of security. The increasing de-
pendence of the economy and daily life on technology (Internet
of Things, autonomous transport systems, advances in commu-
nications, as noted above) will heighten the demand for private
sector cyber security services. The foresight studies analysed
underline the importance of the cyber defence and cyber secu-
rity of the state’s strategic resources (armed forces, public ad-
ministration, critical infrastructures) and of collaboration with
the relevant companies for the protection of strategic private
interests (financial sector, energy and other facilities) [21].
However, it is assumed that, on a smaller scale, vital cyber
security needs will be a service provided by the market.
– Identity networks stimulated by an interconnected world
and constructed in support of or in opposition to global-
isation. The networks posing greatest implications for
security will be those driven by extremist ideologies of
assorted inspirations: nationalist, pro-independence, xe-
nophobic and anti-immigration, far left, far right, radical
Islamists etc. [22]. Even if they do not cross the violence
threshold, the activism and the social polarisation gener-
ated could seriously condition states’ domestic and for-
eign policy [25]. Some of these networks will capitalise
on currents of opinion –more or less widespread depend-
ing on the country– of suspicion and hostility towards
elites, political institutions and the effects of economic
globalisation. Positive opinions of democracy are on the
decline among the new generations of Europeans and
Americans and may decline further in the coming de-
cades, particularly if the youngest segments of the popu-
lation continue to be worst hit by unemployment and the
precarisation of the middle classes [8, 9, 21, 24].
The aforementioned networks may also be taken advantage
of by a foreign power seeking to delegitimise geopolitical rivals.
Strategic communication will be used increasingly to influence
world public opinion and the populations of competitor nations.
It is a further tool that can be deployed to increase the share of
relative power in the international system [19, 24]. An abun-
dance of information not accompanied by the required skills to
turn it into knowledge (perhaps due to failings in the education
system) increases the risk of trivialising important debates and is
fertile ground for propaganda [9]. The danger of ‘post truth’,
already present today, will tend to become more serious in the
coming decades. The implications for decision-making are seri-
ous given that manipulation can easily give rise to blocking and
vilifying coalitions instead of constructive alliances to address
common challenges and put in place policies in line with reality
[11, 21, 24, 25].
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Technologies associated with virtual sociability will con-
tinue to facilitate the organisation and spread of social protests
that transcend borders and trigger other protests with ever-
greater speed [22]. They will also enable governments and
non-state actors to gauge social discontent within their own
countries and in competitor states and defuse or exploit this for
their own ends [7]. For example, nationalism could be used to
consolidate an autocratic government, support revisionist for-
eign policies or seek foreign scapegoats to alleviate domestic
pressure, shifting responsibility for problems to immigrants,
international organisations or a geopolitical rival [24].
Furthermore, major transformations driven by demographic
changes and the unequal distribution of wealth will generate cru-
cial political and social debates. Social media can thus acquire a
political importance similar to that of classical intermediaries such
as parties and trade unions, forcing them to adapt more or less
successfully, as is already occurring today. These dynamics will
lead to positive effects, such as a greater demand for transparency
on the part of the authorities or greater opportunities to ensure
representation and to place issues on the public agenda [18].
– Lastly, advances in technology will increase the capaci-
ties and impact of terrorist and criminal activities, as de-
scribed above in the section on the world system. The
emergence of new and violent ideologies, for example
opposed to technological progress that endangers em-
ployment, cannot be ruled out. An increasingly inter-
connected world will trigger an increase –rather than a
reduction– in the differences and conflicts over values
and identities [24].
Conclusion
Themeta-study offered in this paper highlights the growing com-
plexity of political and social relations in the twenty-first century.
It would be an error to view the future based exclusively on
current trends. The value of the works referred to here lies in
the fact that they set out alternative directions the futuremay take.
Accordingly, the techniques for scenario building and anal-
ysis draw a distinction between basic trends and key uncer-
tainties. The former include demographic imbalances, migra-
tory flows, the political and economic rise of Asia Pacific,
inequalities in the distribution of wealth, and the increased
interconnection of the world due to advances in information
technologies. The key uncertainties referred to in the pages
above include the speed and extent of the impact of climate
change, the degree of cooperation or rivalry between the major
powers, technological advances in artificial intelligence, the
repetition of new economic crises which could spread easily in
an interdependent world, and the type of harm caused by a
new regional or even global terrorist organisation (a reborn Al
Qaeda, for instance). All these factors could materialise to
different degrees and would affect other variables, triggering
various effects, which would not all be easy to predict.
An important finding of this meta-study is the high degree
of coincidence in the various documents as regards the main
basic trends and the substantial consensus in the identification
of the key uncertainties. It is possible that the literature review
carried out for the initial phase of the studies works –as noted
above in the section on the process followed in their prepara-
tion– unintentionally conditioned the identification of the ba-
sic trends and key uncertainties. Thus, while recognising the
indispensable nature of such a review, it is important to bear in
mind the risk involved, in order not to curtail possible visions
during this initial stage of foresight analysis.
Together with basic trends and key uncertainties, most of the
foresight studies analysed include a list of highly improbable
and high-impact events, which have also been referred to here
(wild cards and black swans). Examples of past black swans
include the attacks onWashington andNewYork in 2001 or the
Arab uprisings of 2011 [37]. According to the literature
consulted, future events might include open armed conflict be-
tween China and the United States in Asia Pacific, one in which
other countries in the region might be drawn. Such a conflict
would seriously destabilise the global economy and global se-
curity. A regional conflict –for example, between India and
Pakistan with dozens of atmospheric nuclear detonations and
the resulting serious consequences for the global climate and
environment– would also have a highly negative impact.
Positive developments may include the discovery of an inex-
haustible and inexpensive source of energy that would drasti-
cally reduce the current dependence on hydrocarbons. It is of
interest to contemplate these potential black swans although not
for their predictive value, since it is highly unlikely that any will
materialise or they will do so very differently to the manner
suggested. Their value lies in the fact that they force us to
observe trends, uncertainties and the resulting scenarios with a
much more open mind and with greater sensitivity both to
changes in the values of the variables identified and to the
outcomes of the interactions between said variables.
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